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Houston v. Bank of America Federal Savings Bank, 78 P.3d 71
(Nev. 2003).1
PROPERTY – EQUITABLE SUBROGATION
Summary
Appellants Edward R. Houston and Regina Houston paid David Boone $740,000
for investment services, which Boone converted to his own use. In May 1998, Boone and
his wife Donna divorced and Boone quitclaimed real property to Donna. Norwest
Mortgage, Respondent Bank of America’s predecessor, held a deed of trust on the real
property for $342,000. That same month, the Houstons filed a complaint against Boone
to recover their $740,000. The Houstons filed a notice of lis pendens in the Clark County
Recorder’s Office on June 1, 1998 and filed an ex parte motion with the district court
directing the issuance of a prejudgment writ of attachment. The court granted the motion
and a writ of attachment was filed in the Clark County Recorder’s Office in June 1998.
The Houstons obtained a judgment against Boone, who had filed for bankruptcy. Boone
stipulated that the debt he owed to the Houstons was nondischargeable. The district court
granted a writ of execution on the real property and scheduled a sale of the real property.
Respondent Bank of America intervened and the sale was enjoined.
Bank of America had refinanced the real property in June 1998, after the
Houstons’ writ of attachment had been recorded. In May 1998, pursuant to Bank of
America’s direction, Nevada Title Company had conducted a title search of the property.
Both Bank of America and the Houstons filed motions for summary judgment
after the district court enjoined the sale. Bank of America argued that it was the priority
lien holder on the real property because it was equitably subrogated to the rights of
Norwest Mortgage when it refinanced the property. The Houstons argued that Bank of
America was negligent in failing to discover their interest in the real property and that
they would be injured if the district court allowed Bank of America to hold the priority
lien position. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Bank of America
and denied the Houston’s motion for summary judgment. The Houstons appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court adopted the approach of the Restatement (Third) of
Property for equitable subrogation and found that because the Houstons failed to produce
any evidence that equitable subrogation of Bank of America to Norwest’s priority lien
position would materially prejudice them, Bank of America was entitled to equitable
subrogation as to the full amount of the Norwest Mortgage deed of trust.
Issue and Disposition
Issue
Is a lender who pays off a prior note equitably subrogated to the former lender’s
priority position?
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Does it matter if there is an intervening lien holder?
Disposition
Yes. A subsequent lender who pays off a prior note is equitably subrogated to the
prior lender’s priority lien position.
No. The subsequent lender will still be equitably subrogated to the full amount of
the prior note even if there is an intervening lien holder, so long as the intervening lien
holder is not materially prejudiced.
Commentary
State of the Law Before Houston
The issue presented in Houston is one of first impression. Prior to Houston, the
Nevada Supreme Court addressed equitable subrogation in Laffranchini v. Clark.
However, in Laffranchini, the issue was equitable subrogation of a holder of an invalid
mortgage when the holder was an involuntary creditor.2 In Laffranchini, the court held
that the holder of the invalid mortgage was entitled to be equitably subrogated to the
priority position of the lender whose note it had paid off because the holder was not a
volunteer.3 Other jurisdictions have adopted three different approaches to determine
when a second lender will be equitably subrogated to the priority of the first lender when
a third party holds a lien on the property at the time the second lender paid off the first
lender’s encumbrance.4
Other Jurisdictions – The Majority Approach
The majority approach is that actual knowledge of an existing lien prevents the
second holder from being equitably subrogated to the priority of the first lender, but
constructive knowledge does not.5 The majority approach reasons that if a mortgagee
does not have actual knowledge of a junior lien holder, the mortgagee expected to assume
the position of the creditor whose lien it is paying off.6 However, the majority rule
encourages prospective lenders to avoid conducting title searches because the lender who
fails to conduct a title search will be equitably subrogated to the priority position by
virtue of its lack of actual knowledge. On the other hand, the lender who dutifully
conducts a title search and discovers a junior lien holder will not be equitably subrogated
to the priority position.
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Laffranchini v. Clark, 39 Nev. 48, 55-56, 153 P. 250, 251-52 (1915).
Id.
4
East Boston Savings Bank v. Ogan, 701 N.E.2d 331, 335 (Mass. 1998).
5
See, e.g. Osterman v. Babar, 714 N.E.2d 735, 739 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Rusher v. Bunker, 782 P.2d 170,
172 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
6
George E. Osborne, Mortgages § 282, at 573 (2d ed. 1970).
3
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Other Jurisdictions – The Actual or Constructive Knowledge Approach
The second approach prevents the second lien holder from being equitably
subrogated when that holder has either actual or constructive knowledge of an existing
junior lien.7 Additionally, some courts will hold a sophisticated lender to a higher
standard or will consider the lender’s negligence in determining whether to apply
equitable subrogation.8 This approach, however, fails to account for the very purpose of
equitable subrogation. Equitable subrogation is designed to prevent a junior lienor from
being advanced to the priority lien position over a secondary holder who has paid off the
first lien on the real property.9 In that instance, allowing a junior lienor to be elevated to
the priority position would afford the junior lienor an undeserved windfall.10 Negligence
and constructive knowledge should not be factored into whether a lender will be
equitably subrogated. Equitable subrogation is aimed at protecting the lender’s justified
expectation11 in receiving a security interest in the property and at preventing the unjust
enrichment of the junior lienor.12
Other Jurisdictions – The Restatement (Third) of Property Approach
The Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages, section 7.6 does not consider
whether a lender has actual or constructive notice of a junior lien, but only whether a
junior lien holder will be prejudiced if the second lender is equitably subrogated to the
priority position.13 Notice of an intervening lien will not prevent a party from being
equitably subrogated.14 The issue is whether the secondary lienor expected to be
subrogated to the priority lien position upon payment of the priority lien.15 Equitable
subrogation of a refinancing mortgagee will not occur only if there is affirmative proof
that the refinancing mortgagee intended to subrogate its interest to the intervening junior
lienor.16 The intervening junior lien suffers no material prejudice by applying the
doctrine of equitable subrogation because the junior lienor remains in the same position it

7

See Harms v. Burt, 40 P.3d 329, 332 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002); 681 A.2d 1005, 1007-08 (Conn. App. Ct.
1996).
8
See, e.g. Universal Title Ins. Co. v. United States, 942 F.2d 1311, 1317 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that
professionals will be held to a higher standard than lay persons when determining equitable subrogation);
Bankers Trust Co. v. United States, 25 P.3d 877, 882 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001).
9
Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages § 7.6 cmt. a.
10
Id.
11
Even where a lender has actual knowledge of an existing lien on real property, that lender assumes it will
be equitably subrogated to the priority lien position. Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages § 7.6 cmt.
e.
12
Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law § 10.6, at 15-16 (4th ed. 2002).
13
See, e.g. Suntrust Bank v. Riverside Nat. Bank, 792 So. 2d 1222, 1227 n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001);
Trus Joist Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 462 A.2d 603, 609 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983); Klotz v.
Klotz, 440 N.W.2d 406, 407-10 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989). Trus Joist Corp. and Klotz do not adopt the
Restatement, but the holdings are similar to the Restatement view.
14
Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages §7.6(a)(4).
15
Id.
16
Id.
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held prior to refinancing17.18 The intervening lienor is “no worse off than before the
senior obligation was discharged.”19
Effect of Houston on current law
In Houston, the court reasoned through the above approaches for equitable
subrogation and adopted the Restatement (Third) of Property approach. Bank of America
paid in full the deed of trust held by Norwest Mortgage. The district court found that
Bank of America paid the deed of trust “with the intention and belief that it would
acquire Norwest Mortgage’s first-position deed of trust lien on the Property.” There was
no evidence that Bank of America intended to subordinate its lien priority to the
Houstons.20 The Houstons argued that issues of fact existed as to whether they would be
materially prejudiced by equitably subrogating Bank of America to the priority position.
However, the Houstons did not produce any evidence of prejudice nor did they request
additional time to produce such evidence. The Houstons did not show that a change in
the mortgagor from Boone and Donna to just Donna materially prejudiced them.21 The
Houstons did not provide evidence that the new loan’s terms modified the previous loan’s
terms in such a manner as to materially prejudice them. Therefore, Bank of America was
entitled to be equitably subrogated to the full amount of Norwest Mortgage’s priority lien
position.
Unanswered Questions
Central to the Restatement (Third) of Property approach to equitable subrogation
is the issue of material prejudice to the intervening lender. However, the court failed to
clarify what exactly constitutes material prejudice. The court stated that had there been a
showing that the transfer of mortgagor resulted in a mortgagor with a bad credit rating, so
little money, or so few assets that the bank would likely have to foreclose on the property
resulting in a loss of the intervening lienor’s interest in the property, such might serve as
material prejudice. However, the court did not affirmatively state that these factors are
the guidelines for determining material prejudice.
17

However, should subrogation result in material prejudice to the junior lienor, equitable subrogation will
not be applied. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 10, § 10.6, at 19.
18
Id.
19
Id. at § 7.6 cmt. a.
20
The Houstons argued that Bank of America was negligent in failing to discover the lis pendens and the
writ of attachment and that factual issues existed as to whether Bank of America was justified in relying on
a title report run one month prior to the closing of the loan. The Nevada Supreme Court found that because
it was adopting the Restatement position, Bank of America’s negligence in failing to discover the lis
pendens and writ of attachment was irrelevant. The court did not address the Houston’s contention that
factual issues existed as to whether Bank of America was reasonable in relying on the month-old title
report. It is most likely that the court did not address this because under the Restatement view, actual and
constructive knowledge do not matter. Even if Bank of America had actual knowledge of the Houston’s
intervening lien, absent a finding of material prejudice, Bank of America would nonetheless be subrogated
to the priority position.
21
The Houstons made no showing that Donna has poor credit, makes so little money, or has such limited
assets that Bank of America would likely have to foreclose on the property, causing the Houstons to lose
their interest in the property.
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The court also stated there was no evidence of the previous loan’s terms to
compare with the new loan’s terms that would allow a determination of whether
modifications existed that would materially prejudice the intervening lienor. While the
court seemed to indicate that certain modifications in the terms of a new loan would
materially prejudice an intervening lienor, it failed to clarify exactly which terms those
might be. The issue of material prejudice has been left open, resulting almost certainly in
future litigation. The court will then be forced to clearly spell out the factors that
constitute material prejudice in equitable subrogation.
Conclusion
Refinancing lenders are more easily assured of their position following
refinancing of a priority loan. Refinancing lenders almost need not worry about
intervening liens, so long as the refinance does not “materially prejudice” an intervening
lienor. The decision reduces title searches to a mere formality, and seems to place wide
discretion in the hands of lenders in considering what is material prejudice. Intervening
lienors have very little assurance that the recordation of their junior lien will offer any
protection.
Appropriately, the Restatement approach furthers the policy that it is burdensome
for lenders to be expected to conduct a title search multiple times during the course of a
transaction in order to determine whether an intervening lien has attached. Had the court
adopted an actual or constructive notice approach for equitable subrogation, a refinancing
lender would be expected to conduct a title search a minimum of two times (once in the
beginning of the transaction and once prior to closing). Serious problems would arise
when the lender found a clean title at the beginning of the refinancing process yet
suddenly was presented with an intervening lien on the closing date. A lender would be
forced to conduct a title search almost every day in order to make sure that the lender
would not lose its priority position through the refinance. Requiring this of lenders
would seriously clog the refinancing process and make it an unavailable process for most
homeowners. Compared to the approaches adopted by other jurisdictions, the
Restatement approach seems to be the most consistent with the purpose of equitable
subrogation.
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